






















AN EU MEMBER STATE 
THROUGH DEMOCRACY 




Summary  This contribution studies the process of building an EU member state through 
democracy promotion in the case of Croatia with a special focus on two reform initiatives 
in the field of Public Administration Reform (PAR). Croatia’s experience is representative of 
intense efforts of the international community to overcome the consequences of violent 
state dissolution and civil war. The EU in particular has assisted post-conflict democratiza-
tion with diplomatic initiatives, the provision of aid, and political conditionality. The Cro-
atian political elite showed great willingness to implement democratic reforms, while at 
the same time remaining critical of what they viewed as ‘too much’ external interference 
in domestic state affairs. Based on 30 interviews with Croatian officials, Croatian civil soci-
ety actors, members of the EU delegation and other representatives of the international 
donor community, we empirically assess progress and setbacks in Croatia’s public admini-
stration reform and explain why some reform initiatives have been successfully imple-
mented while others are still pending.
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With its accession to the Europe-
an Union (EU) on 1 July 2013, Croatia 
is a forerunner in the next EU enlarge-
ment round towards the Western Bal-
kans. Croatia gets rewarded for substan-
tial democratization progress since the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
ceased to exist in the early 1990s. How-
ever, transition to democracy was not a 
smooth process. Although the EU of-
fered a membership perspective already 
in 2000 (Grimm and Mathis, 2012), it 
took over a decade to transform Croa-
tia’s political, social and economic sys-
tem to comply with EU accession cri-
teria; some reforms are still pending. 
Croatia shares this feature of slow transi-
tion with mixed results despite (or may-
be because?) of intensive internation-
al pressure to democratize with many 
other post-conflict countries. How can 
these mixed results be explained? 
Previous explanations in democ-
ratization and democracy promotion 
studies hint to the general level of dif-
ficulty of a threefold political, econom-
ic and social transformation, the unwill-
ingness or inability of domestic actors 
to handle a regime change and there-
by also to comply with external reform 
demands, or the overall legacies of vio-
lent conflict such as the loss of societal 
trust and the economic damage caused 
that hinder a transition to democracy. 
This article goes beyond such explana-
tions. Based on a fine-grained process-
tracing of Croatia’s Public Administra-
tion Reform (PAR; in Croatian Reforma 
javne uprave), we developed a twofold 
argument to explain the mixed results 
of democratization under external over-
sight. Firstly, we argue that reform out-
puts heavily depend on the interplay of 
external and domestic actors. Thereby, 
interactions between external and do-
mestic actors in the domestic arena are 
systematized and their influences traced 
to outputs. Secondly, we put emphasis 
on a neglected dimension in the litera-
ture, namely the importance of domestic 
third parties for policy-making. Here, it 
is argued that what external actors per-
ceive as a ‘delay’ in the process is in fact 
the domestic government’s democratic 
obligation to negotiate with third party 
representatives affected by potential re-
form decisions in order to anticipate and 
avoid negative side-effects of reform. 
To empirically validate this twofold 
argument, the contribution proceeds as 
follows: In Section 2, the case of Croatia’s 
PAR is introduced. Section 3 discusses 
the methodological approach and our 
understanding of the external-domes-
tic interplay in democracy promotion. 
This is employed in Section 4 to conduct 
a fine-grained process-tracing of the ac-
tors’ interactions and the forms of third 
party involvement during the reform 
process. A concluding section 5 summa-
rizes the results of the analysis.
2. Croatia’s Way into 
the European Union
In 2013, Croatia has finally joined 
the club of EU member states. This 
was possible only after going through 
a number of challenging reform pro-
cesses, which aimed to make Croatia a 
democratic state fit for the EU. Interna-
tionally isolated under Franjo Tudjman’s 
regime during the 1990s, Croatia’s way 
into the EU seriously started only after 
Tudjman’s death and the change of go-
vernment in 2000 to a centre-left coali-
tion under Prime Minister Ivica Račan 












ducing the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP) in 2001, the prospect of 
joining the EU became more credible for 
the Croatian political elite and proved to 
be an additional motivation for demo-
cratic reforms.
Official accession talks with Croatia 
only started in October 2005 and were 
afterwards abandoned several times to 
pressure the Croatian government into 
concessions regarding the extradition of 
war criminals to the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via (ICTY) or to reach a compromise in 
the border dispute with Slovenia. So the 
transition of Croatia illustrates both suc-
cesses and failures in democratization 
under external oversight. On the one 
hand, Croatia made considerable pro-
gress in democratization, as the grant-
ing of EU accession shows. On the other 
hand, EU Progress Reports continuous-
ly criticize the Croatian government for 
its slow progress in reform areas of judi-
ciary or administration and in the fight 
against corruption (Grandits, 2007; Za-
kosek, 2008; European Commission, 
2010: 7-9). Croatian scholars also warn 
of insufficient capacity of the Croatian 
administration to substantively engage 
in policy analysis and policy formula-
tion (Petak and Petek, 2009). Particular-
ly in the field of public administration, 
the EU moaned that the legal basis for 
building a modern and professional civil 
service was incomplete, that not all re-
quired laws were adopted and not all le-
gal acts harmonized. 
The EU’s Involvement in Croatia’s 
Public Administration Reform
The negotiations during democra-
cy promotion are studied here using 
the case of Croatian public administra-
tion reform as an example. The reform 
of the Croatian public administration is 
usually described as having developed 
in three phases (Koprić , 2009a, 2011b): 
the first phase from 1990 to 1993 saw 
the establishment of a rather central-
ized and politicized state bureaucracy 
under Tudjman; the second phase from 
1993 to 2001 consolidated given struc-
tures. Serious reform efforts in Croa-
tian public administration started in the 
third phase beginning in 2001, when the 
EU became more active in the Western 
Balkans through the SAP. The exact sta-
tus of the public administration reform 
within the framework of EU accession 
is difficult to determine. PAR does not 
represent a chapter in accession negotia-
tions and is thus not strictly connected 
to EU conditionality and the EU bench-
marking and monitoring system. How-
ever, PAR is part of the soft political cri-
teria and thus regularly discussed in EU 
progress reports. Financial support for 
PAR has been provided through two 
framework programs, the “Communi-
ty Assistance for Reconstruction, De-
velopment and Stabilization” (CARDS) 
and consecutively through the “Instru-
ment of Pre-Accession Assistance” (IPA) 
(Grimm and Mathis, 2012). During the 
2011-2013 period, PAR has represented 
one of the three priorities of EU finan-
cial assistance to Croatia. 
The overall goal of the EU and oth-
er external actors to engage in PAR is to 
optimize the structures and mechanisms 
of administrative state bodies based on 
democratic principles. The four main 
administrative principles shared by all 
EU member states are defined in the 
“European Administrative Space” (EAS): 
(1) the rule of law as “legal certainty and 
predictability of administrative actions 
and decisions”, (2) openness and trans-
























tive processes and outcomes and its con-
sistency with pre-established rules”, (3) 
accountability “of public administration 
to other administrative, legislative or ju-
dicial authorities [to ensure] compliance 
with the rule of law”, and (4) efficiency 
“in the use of public resources and effec-
tiveness in accomplishing and enforcing 
the policy goals established in legisla-
tion” (SIGMA, 1999: 8-14).
For democracy promoters, reform-
ing the public administration also en-
tails changing the relationship between 
the state and its citizens from a hierar-
chical relation to one of equal footing 
(SIGMA, 2007: 2). The main purpose 
of a democratic public administration – 
at the level of state administration, local 
self-government, and public services – is 
to service its citizens. This also requires 
promoting a proactive way of think-
ing of state officials, and reliable, open, 
transparent and citizen-oriented public 
administrations. Those are considered 
constituent parts of a good business en-
vironment and prerequisites of a better 
standard of life for all citizens (European 
Commission, 2007, 2012). We are inter-
ested now in the patterns of interaction 
that emerge when these international 
demands for reform meet with the do-
mestic sphere.
Comparing Two PAR Reform Initiatives: 
GAPA and CSSA
Two reform initiatives were selected 
based on their variance in reform out-
put (policy-adoption by the Croatian 
parliament or no policy-adoption): the 
General Administrative Procedures Act 
(GAPA; in Croatian: Zakon o općem up-
ravnom postupku) and the Civil Serv-
ants Salary Act (CSSA; in Croatian: Za-
kon o plaćama državnih službenika). At 
the end of 2011, the cut-off point for 
this study, a version of GAPA had been 
adopted in parliament (‘success’); in 
contrast, CSSA was still being negotiat-
ed between the government and third-
party actors (‘no success’).1
Reforming the GAPA aims to simpli-
fy and speed up administrative decision-
making to improve services for both ci-
tizens and businesses; while the reform 
of CSSA is an attempt to unify the wage 
system for civil servants in order to ren-
der it more competitive.2 In both cases, 
the Croatian Ministry of Administration 
(MoA; in Croatian: Ministarstvo uprave) 
is responsible for the preparation and 
implementation of reforms, which be-
gan in 2003. The two PAR reform initia-
tives are similar with regard to external 
factors. The sets of requirements for the 
measures are only loosely defined, based 
on EAS principles and EU Best Practices 
(Interview D5); the credibility of the re-
ward (in the form of EU membership) is 
high. The process of EU democracy pro-
motion has been shaped in both cases by 
diplomacy, democracy assistance, and 
(soft) conditionality; and the two reform 
1 The cut-off point was chosen due to prag-
matic reasons; however, our findings are still 
valid. The most recent EU Progress Report of 
10 October 2012 yet admonishes the Croa-
tian government that ‘[t]he legal framework 
on salaries, necessary to ensure merit-based 
promotion and reward mechanisms and to 
attract and retain qualified personnel, still 
remains to be finalized’ (European Commis-
sion, 2012: 6).
2 The previous GAPA, dating from Yugo-
slav times, was regarded as too complex, as 
(over-)regulating individual administrative 
steps, and as suffering from unclear proce-
dures and limited chances for appeal (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2007: 8), while being 
prone to arbitrary decision-making, legal un-












initiatives differ only slightly in terms of 
the financial resources invested.3 With 
respect to domestic factors, GAPA and 
CSSA differ concerning the number of 
potential veto players and the poten-
tial for societal mobilization: GAPA in-
volved the MoA, the cabinet, and (at lat-
er stages) the parliament in negotiations, 
whereas CSSA additionally included the 
Ministry of Finance, other line minis-
tries, and various Croatian trade unions. 
3. Methodological Approach 
In our research, we refer to qualita-
tive approaches of the comparative case 
study method to conceptualize and ana-
lyse the external-domestic interplay and 
the involvement of third parties (Ger-
ring, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005). 
Process-tracing of the two reform initi-
atives serves to disentangle variation in 
the external-domestic interplay during 
reform and to explain the different out-
puts. We employ a classical policy-cycle 
as an analytical frame for process-trac-
ing. A typology of external and domes-
tic instruments is used to trace the exter-
nal-domestic interplay. 
Data Collection and Analysis
The primary instruments of data 
collection were semi-structured expert 
interviews which were then comple-
mented by document analysis.4 The aim 
3 GAPA received slightly more attention, with 
two EU grants (CARDS 2003 and IPA 2008), 
while CSSA profited from a CARDS 2001 
project grant and lesser assistance from ex-
ternal consultants from the World Bank and 
SIGMA (Interviews D5; E3; E4; E6).
4 Document analysis refers to the annual EU 
Progress Reports, Pre-Accession Economic 
Recovery Programmes, and project evalua-
tions.
of the interviews was to gain detailed 
knowledge about the process of interac-
tion between external and domestic ac-
tors in order to identify patterns of inter-
action within specific reform initiatives. 
Interview partners were selected to in-
clude those interaction experts most 
closely involved in the administration 
reforms, especially individuals at the in-
terface between external and domestic 
actors (Ritchie, Lewis and Elan, 2003: 
56). The domestic interview partners 
were officials in the MoA (at different 
levels in the hierarchy), the Chief Nego-
tiator’s Office, national agencies manag-
ing EU assistance, and trade unions. Ex-
ternal actors included members of the 
EU Delegation in Croatia, team mem-
bers for EU financial assistance projects, 
and a few other donors in the field. In 
total, 30 interviews were held between 
August and November 2011. Depend-
ing on the interviewee, the interviews 
were held either in Croatian or in Eng-
lish. References to interview partners 
have been anonymized (the letter ‘D’ in-
dicates an interviewee on the domestic 
side; ‘E’ an interviewee on the external 
side) and consecutively numbered.
The Typology of External 
and Domestic Instruments
To describe and analyse the patterns 
of the external-domestic interplay we 
refer to a typology of external and do-
mestic instruments and their respective 
means that we developed elsewhere (see 
Gross and Grimm, 2013). On the exter-
nal side, we differentiate between the in-
struments of diplomacy, democracy as-
sistance, conditionality, and supervision 
(Grimm, 2010). The external instru-
ments differ according to the general lev-
el of leverage that external actors are able 
























reform process, with diplomacy having 
the least leverage and supervision the 
most. In practice, however, instruments 
are used complementarily and are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. 
On the domestic side, we identify six 
instruments that characterize domes-
tic actors’ behaviour in the external-do-
mestic interplay: diplomacy, take-over, 
slowdown, modification, resistance, and 
emancipation. Here, a ranking of instru-
ments is more difficult, as the attitude 
of domestic actors towards external de-
mands for democratic reforms can range 
from very supportive to very critical. But 
even reform-critical attitudes of govern-
ments and state officials of democratiz-
ing countries do not necessarily mean 
that domestic actors oppose the funda-
mental ideas that lie behind an external 
reform initiative – such as improving 
transparency, accountability, or service-
orientation to citizens – but they might 
substantially disagree with the scope 
and scale of desired reforms, the de-
gree of local third-party participation in 
policy-making, or estimated feasibility 
of implementation. Table 1 presents an 
overview of these instruments, together 
with the various means that can be used 
by external or domestic actors to direct 
the reform process.
Side Instrument Means
External Diplomacy discuss and argue, consult stakeholders, ally with 
stakeholders/third parties, lobby, issue ‘recommendations’, 
issue communiqués, modify/drop demand
Democracy 
Assistance
empower, ‘propose’ assistance, set pre-conditions, control 
assistance, advise on policy, draft policy paper, draft law, 
advise on implementation, re-allocate/withdraw, modify/
drop demand
Conditionality set soft criteria, set benchmarks, monitor, threat to deny 
EU membership, modify or drop demand
Supervision execute veto power, draft laws, adopt laws, implement laws
Domestic Diplomacy discuss and argue, consult stakeholders, ally with 
stakeholders/third parties
Take-over agree to EU goals, agree to EU demands, use EU tools
Slowdown pay ‘lip service’, assign low priority, assign low 
resources, find no agreement, postpone decision, delay 
implementation, delegate responsibility ineffectively, 
re-organize working groups
Modification adopt and ignore, adopt and re-interpret, change reform 
draft, re-write reform draft
Resistance resist EU demands, reject experts, reject specific 
terminology, reject draft law, reject assistance
Emancipation develop own goals, develop own strategies, provide own 
funding













4. Tracing the External-Domestic 
Interplay
Democracy Promoters and Their 
Counterparts: Mapping the Field 
of Actors
EU accession negotiations involve 
many different actors that can hardly 
be covered by the common description 
of external actors as ‘drivers for change’ 
(Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, 
2006; European Commission, 2007) and 
domestic actors as ‘spoilers’ of reform 
(Stedman, 1997). Mainstream literature 
on the EU and democracy promotion 
tends to portray the national side in a 
one-dimensional way as being either re-
form-oriented or reform-opposed. Lit-
tle attention has been paid to the differ-
ent ideas and interests of involved actors 
and to internal struggles between more 
or less EU-critical parts in Croatian so-
ciety. Therefore, we would like to shed 
some light on the diversity of domestic 
actors involved in these externally in-
duced reform processes. Our interviews 
with involved actors revealed that exter-
nal as well as domestic actors are divid-
ed in their judgment on how EU demo-
cracy promotion is put in place on the 
ground. Different attitudes exist with-
in each group with regard to the con-
tent and practice of democracy promo-
tion. To disentangle the different groups 
of actors based on their attitude towards 
reform, we propose to differentiate be-
tween change agents, neutrals and sta-
tus quo seekers on the domestic side, and 
radicals, moderates, and critical insiders 
on the side of EU democracy promoters. 
Inside Croatian society, change agents 
are those individuals that are pro-reform 
oriented, supportive of EU demands for 
democratic reforms, and critical of what 
they perceive as a slow reform progress 
in some policy fields. They can be found 
as (mostly) young technocrats within 
the Croatian administration, in acade-
mia, or as professionals working in ci-
vil society organizations. In the Croatian 
administration, change agents work pre-
dominantly in those institutions most 
exposed to the EU such as the Chief Ne-
gotiator’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and EU Integration, the Mini-
stry of Finance or specific EU agen-
cies such as the Central Office for De-
velopment Strategy and Coordination 
of EU Funds (CODEF) and the Cen-
tral Financing and Contracting Agency 
(CFCA). Change agents are very well ac-
quainted with EU habitus and EU talk. 
Neutrals are those actors involved in the 
reform process that have neither a par-
ticular position nor a stake in the re-
form. They are often at the end of their 
career and orientate their actions at their 
supervisors’ demand. Status quo seekers 
are those actors less supportive of EU 
demands with a rather critical attitude 
towards reform initiatives. They do so 
either because they are not interested in 
changing their routines, as reforms al-
ways entail new ways of doing things, or 
because they fear to lose status or bene-
fits within the newly introduced order. 
They might also be opposed to reform, 
because they are not convinced of the 
proposed changes. Neutrals and status 
quo seekers are mostly found within the 
administration and less frequently with-
in academia or civil society. 
On the side of external actors, dif-
ferent attitudes towards the reform pro-
cess exist as well. Radicals demand very 
far-reaching changes close to a com-
plete re-structuration of a policy field. 
They follow an ideal type of liberal de-
mocracy that can hardly be found in 
























the reform proposals made by radicals 
would never find support in some EU 
countries). Usually, radicals grew up in 
OECD countries, and work for some in-
ternational organizations. Moderates are 
more open to compromise and willing 
to adjust their reform demands to local 
propositions. They are interested in the 
domestic context and are orientated to-
wards democratic improvements in the 
current system. Critical insiders are sup-
portive of democratic reforms, but do 
reflect on their own role as democracy 
promoters. They might wish for more 
participatory involvement of their local 
counterparts in democracy promotion 
and are critical towards too radical re-
form demands that go along with strong 
top-down approaches.
Having those distinctions in mind, 
it is also important to note that the line 
between external and domestic actors in 
democracy promotion is not clear-cut. 
Instead, there tends to be a considerable 
number of Croatian change agents in the 
society involved in the reform process 
– in the position of an ‘external actor’. 
Within the framework of financial as-
sistance, the EU and other international 
institutions engage Croatian academics 
or members from Croatian civil society 
organizations to work as consultants in 
one of the project teams pushing the re-
form process. Today, most of the finan-
cial assistance projects are given to pro-
ject teams with a majority of Croatian 
members, or even to a purely Croatian 
consortium. In this way, ‘external’ Croa-
tian change agents influence the reform 
process as project team members at very 
early stages of policy formulation, which 
would have never been possible in a tra-
ditional policy-cycle. Another way to 
blur the line between domestic and ex-
ternal actors is the practice of interna-
tional organizations to hire Croatian 
personnel. Usually, they are employed 
for lower level positions such as task 
managers, but for example in the case of 
the World Bank, the Senior Economist 
for Croatia is a Croatian woman. In that 
sense, some Croatian change agents are 
constantly switching their role between 
domestic and external actor. 
The External-Domestic Interplay in the 
Reform of the Public Administration
Taking GAPA and CSSA as examples, 
we show how the interplay between ex-
ternal and domestic actors in EU mem-
bership state building works in practice. 
The concept of the policy-cycle serves to 
investigate the external-domestic inter-
play and the instruments employed by 
the two sides to promote their political 
interests discussed (Scharpf, 1973). The 
policy-cycle describes policy-making as 
a sequence of stages – agenda-setting, 
policy-formulation, policy-adoption, 
policy-implementation, and evaluation 
– related to decisions and actions con-
cerning a specific policy (ibid.: 169). The 
external-domestic interplay takes place 
through the entire process, making the 
policy-cycle a useful tool to separate the 
different phases of interaction. Due to 
limited space, the analysis concentrates 
on the first three steps of the policy-cy-
cle of GAPA and CSSA: agenda-setting, 
policy-formulation, and policy-adop-
tion. Finally, the dynamics of the inter-




With a reform of GAPA, external ac-
tors sought to enhance the legal certain-
ty, transparency, and effectiveness of the 
Croatian administration by introducing 












of regulations, and decreasing the my-
riad ‘special procedures’ that required 
specific administrative decisions to be 
amended by the parliament (SIGMA, 
2007). Reforming GAPA meant chang-
ing the backbone of the Croatian admi-
nistration, which had been functioning 
on this legal basis since the 1950s under 
the Yugoslav-socialist rule.5
The main external actor promot-
ing the reform of GAPA was the EU, 
who regularly discussed the progress 
of this reform in accession negotia-
tions and provided financial assistance 
with CARDS 2003 and IPA 2008 pro-
jects. Complementary assistance was of-
fered by the Danish bilateral assistance 
programme, USAID, and SIGMA.6 The 
main actor on the Croatian side dur-
ing the phase of policy-formulation was 
the Ministry of Administration (MoA), 
the domestic institution responsible for 
drafting and implementing the reform 
at the level of ministers, state secreta-
ries, and heads of division. The Croatian 
cabinet and parliament were also part 
of the decision-making process, and the 
Croatian Office of the Chief Negotiator 
discussed GAPA in EU accession nego-
tiations.
Agenda-Setting (2003)
In the case of GAPA, the EU acted 
as the agenda-setter, demanding align-
ment of administrative regulations with 
5 The Yugoslav GAPA from 1956 was amend-
ed in 1965, 1977, 1978 and 1986, but its main 
features remained similar, even to the old 
Yugoslav General Administrative Procedure 
Act of 1930 (see Koprić, 2011a: 439).
6  German political party foundations sup-
ported administration reform already in 
1991/1992, but with limited financial re-
sources.
European administrative principles. In 
2003, the European Commission offered 
financial assistance to reform GAPA 
through the CARDS 2003 project. At 
first, reform demands were met with re-
sistance by the Croatian government. It 
rejected the proposed assistance as it did 
not see a need for reform. Only after dis-
cussions did the Croatian government 
agree to EU demands and to the CARDS 
2003 project, which was scheduled to 
begin in 2006.
Policy-Formulation Phase 1: 
Low Interaction (2003-2005)
The first phase of policy-formula-
tion, from 2003 to 2005, was character-
ized by low levels of external-domestic 
interaction. External reform demands 
were met with slowdown by domestic 
actors. The MoA assigned low priori-
ty to the reform, establishing a working 
group that was never invited to meet. 
The following year, external actors re-
acted with democracy assistance to push 
the process forward. SIGMA offered as-
sistance in the form of an expert who 
would advise on policy-formulation by 
assessing possible amendments to the 
old GAPA (Interview D6; Republic of 
Croatia, 2005).
Policy-Formulation Phase 2: 
High Interaction (2006-2008)
The second phase of policy-formu-
lation, from 2006 to 2008, was charac-
terized by high levels of interaction be-
tween external actors and the MoA. 
When the CARDS 2003 project start-
ed, the project team engaged very ac-
tively in advising on policy-formulation, 
analysing reform options, and prepar-
ing policy papers and strategy papers 
on ‘Principles of Public Administration 
and Objectives of Administrative Proce-
























project team was dominated by radical 
reformers who proposed writing a com-
pletely new version of GAPA that would 
cut the 600 procedures down to 200. The 
Croatian persons in charge were a group 
of status quo seekers. They tried to re-
act with slowdown strategies to counter 
reform demands, adopting all pre-for-
mulated documents, but not engaging in 
drafting a new law based on these docu-
ments.
Policy-Formulation Phase 3: 
Escalation and Antagonistic 
Interaction (2008-2009)
As policy adoption approached, in-
teractions between the EU project team, 
the EU Delegation, and the Croatian 
government as a whole began to become 
more antagonistic. At the end of 2007, 
the EU project team presented its draft 
law for the new GAPA, which consist-
ed of a completely new legal framework. 
The proposal was met with resistance; 
as it was considered to be far-reaching. 
Subsequently, the MoA used the stra-
tegy of modification, installing a new 
working group composed of MoA em-
ployees and moderate Croatian academ-
ics to re-write the draft law, again using 
the old GAPA as the point of departure 
and combining it with some of the in-
novations proposed by the project team. 
In response, the EU Delegation resorted 
to more coercive means of diplomacy to 
exert pressure on the ministry. The de-
legation sought alliance with other ex-
ternal actors and asked SIGMA to issue 
critical recommendations on the results 
of the working group. This was met with 
partial success: some recommendations 
were included by the ministerial work-
ing group, but without alterations to the 
basic structure (Interview D6).
Policy-Adoption (2009)
In March 2009, the domestically pre-
pared draft of GAPA was adopted in the 
parliament. In response, the EU Dele-
gation applied the instrument of con-
ditionality to push for further changes. 
In the EU negotiations in October 2009, 
it was argued that the law did not meet 
EU soft political criteria with regard to 
EU best practices for administrations, 
and that EU accession might be endan-
gered if no amendments were made (In-
terview D2). However, the MoA made it 
quite clear that it would not accept fur-
ther changes to the new GAPA, arguing 
that they had ‘found their own solution’ 
to integrate essential EU demands while 
maintaining a basic structure in line 
with established Croatian administra-
tive traditions (Interview D6). After in-
tensive discussions, the EU dropped its 
demands for changes to the new GAPA.
Summary
The reform of GAPA can be judged 
as a mixed result. On the one hand, a 
new law was adopted and enacted. On 
the other hand, the adopted law differs 
to a great extent from the original pro-
posal made by external consultants and 
leaves the basic structure of the old sys-
tem intact (Koprić, 2009b; European 
Commission, 2011). The Croatian go-
vernment was thus satisfied with the re-




The reform of CSSA is regarded by 
the EU as the missing piece of a com-
prehensive reform of the legal basis of 
Croatia’s professional civil service. The 
EU wishes to align and unify Croatia’s 












fiscal responsibility, equal pay for equal 
work, performance-based payments, 
and a competitive salary system. The 
wage system is criticised for being non-
transparent, fragmentary, and without 
performance-based incentives (SIGMA, 
2007). Payment is regulated in several 
separate laws for state civil servants, civil 
servants at local and regional levels, and 
the different public service groups. Spe-
cial laws, decrees, and collective agree-
ments lead to further differences be-
tween the wages of each group (ibid.).
The primary external actor involved 
in CSSA was the EU Delegation. The 
World Bank, SIGMA, and British, Dan-
ish, and Swedish bilateral donor agen-
cies also offered assistance. On the 
Croatian side, the MoA acted as the co-
ordinator of the reform process. A well-
institutionalized tripartite system, the 
so-called ‘social partnership’, required 
the government (including the Minis-
try of Finance and all other line minis-
tries) to negotiate with trade unions on 
this issue (Samostalna služba za soci-
jalno partnerstvo, 2011; Interview D1). 
Reaching an agreement proved difficult. 
The government, under pressure from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
had pledged to cut public spending in 
2009 (Republic of Croatia, 2010). Ad-
justing civil servant salaries through a 
partial salary raise was thus opposed by 
the Ministry of Finance (backed by in-
ternational organizations), while some 
trade unions opposed potential wage re-
ductions or downsizing staff numbers.7
7 To understand the strong opposition on be-
half of different domestic actors, one has to 
take into account two factors: first, the ave-
rage net earning of a Croatian employee is 
7.679 Kuna (1020€), while the salary of state 
civil servants is calculated with a base rate 
Agenda-Setting (2003)
Again, the EU acted as the agenda-
setter by demanding CSSA reform. The 
Croatian government reacted by taking 
over EU demands. A more transparent 
wage system was in its interests as well. 
Policy-Formulation Phase 1: 
Democracy Assistance 
and Slowdown (2003-2008)
Between 2003 and 2008, the interac-
tions between the Croatian government 
and international actors followed a re-
curring pattern: external actors provided 
policy advice via democracy assistance, 
and Croatian decision-makers reacted 
with a general take-over of EU goals, but 
then slowdown followed, postponing 
actual decisions. Several times the MoA 
installed working groups with all affect-
ed ministries and trade unions partici-
pating to negotiate a new CSSA. EU, the 
World Bank, and SIGMA provided de-
mocracy assistance: external consult-
ants analysed the Croatian system, made 
policy recommendations and proposed 
draft laws to the working group. This 
time, international actors involved in 
the reform were comprised of radicals as 
well as moderates. IMF and the World 
Bank pressured for more radical cuts 
in government spending, whereas the 
of 5.108 (679€) (Državni Zavod za Statisti-
ku Republike Hrvatske, 2011: 11). Second, in 
2011, Croatia’s state budget amounted to 42% 
of GDP and the government spent 10.7% of 
GDP on civil servants’ salaries (IMF, 2012: 
29, 31). Plus, the 37 400 Croatian state civil 
servants made up for 2.3% of the employed 
population, which is a relatively high per-
centage in regional comparison (ranging 
from 1.28% to 5.5%) (Cohen, 2010: 10). The 
problem of finding a solution suitable to eve-

























EU and SIGMA were more moderate 
in that regard. In 2005, the government 
postponed the decision on an external-
ly drafted policy until the next year (Re-
public of Croatia, 2006: 76). The govern-
ment took up negotiations within the 
tripartite system again in 2006 to uni-
fy the salary system. Again, a draft law 
was produced with advice of external 
consultants. It was adopted by the gov-
ernment, but was not submitted to the 
parliament in 2007 (Republic of Croatia, 
2007: 66). The government justified its 
slowdown strategy with the vague fiscal 
impact of that law that might risk its dis-
missal in the parliament. The decision 
was postponed to take on discussions at 
a later stage (Interview E2). Theoretical-
ly, the MoA and trade unions were will-
ing to change CSSA, but when pressured 
to introduce severe cuts in wage spend-
ing, they chose the strategy of status quo 
seekers.
Policy-Formulation Phase 2: 
Conditionality (2008-2009)
Starting in 2008, after five years of 
democracy assistance, external actors 
reverted to the instruments of diploma-
cy and conditionality in an attempt to 
speed up the reform process. First, they 
used diplomacy, forming alliance with 
all involved donors and recommend-
ing the government to speed up reform 
(Interview E3). As the government and 
trade unions were still unable to reach 
an agreement and thus continued to 
slow-down the reform process, the EU 
resorted to the use of conditionality. In 
2008, the EU made the adoption of the 
Salary Act a pre-condition for further fi-
nancial grants to the MoA (ibid.). The 
government responded with resistance 
to this EU demand because it anticipated 
that no agreement could be reached with 
trade unions at this point. In the end, the 
EU dropped the pre-condition. It pro-
vided financial assistance despite the 
lack of compliance. However, a gener-
al take-over of EU demands on the part 
of domestic actors can be observed. In 
2008, the government adopted another 
draft law with the help of external advice 
and through discussions within the so-
cial partnership. This draft was submit-
ted to the parliament in January 2009. 
This time, however, the parliament used 
slowdown techniques and postponed 
the decision due to doubts about finan-
cial sustainability. Severe protests and 
strikes by trade unions followed because 
they feared a new proposal would be less 
favourable to their demands.
Policy-Formulation Phase 3: 
Conditionality and Resistance (2009-?)
In the autumn of 2009, in another at-
tempt to heighten reform pressures, the 
EU once again resorted to the instru-
ment of conditionality. It made the adop-
tion of CSSA a benchmark of Chapter 
22 during accession negotiations (Inter-
view D4). This demand was met with re-
sistance from the Croatian government, 
who insisted on reaching an agreement 
with trade unions first; so as not to face 
severe strikes and social unrest. In the 
end, the EU dropped its demand for a 
new CSSA as part of EU benchmarks. In 
the spring of 2011, another round of ne-
gotiations started, again without results. 
The proceedings of the working group 
were delayed until after the elections in 
November 2011. 
Summary
Taking EU criteria as benchmark, 
the reform of CSSA cannot be evaluat-
ed as successful at this point, as no new 












compromise between all the actors in-
volved in the reform of CSSA has prov-
en to be very difficult, due to their wide-
ly diverging interests. However, this also 
means that domestic trade unions have 
been able to influence the process and 
until now have successfully prevented a 
reform in disfavour of civil servants’ in-
terests.
Comparing the External-Domestic 
Interplay in the GAPA and CSSA 
Processes
A comparison of the two externally 
requested reform initiatives reveals that 
both processes had a long phase of up to 
five years in the stage of policy-formu-
lation, in which external actors partici-
pated by providing advice and propos-
ing reform drafts that were generally 
accepted by the Croatian government. 
When the point of policy-adoption ap-
proached, two different developments 
can be observed, depending on whether 
strong veto players were involved in the 
reform or not. 
In the case of GAPA, resistance by 
the status quo seekers to the externally 
proposed reforms manifested itself af-
ter the end of the main democracy-as-
sistance project and shortly before the 
planned adoption of the new law. In the 
first step, the EU project team as a radi-
cal actor (in alliance with other inter-
national actors) used diplomacy to im-
pede essential changes in the draft law, 
but significant modifications of the draft 
law were undertaken by the MoA and 
adopted by the parliament nonetheless. 
In response, the EU resorted to the in-
strument of conditionality, threatening 
to deny EU accession, as the law did not 
meet EU soft political criteria. However, 
because the Croatian government, again 
acting as a status quo seeker, was not 
prepared to include more radical chan-
ges in GAPA, arguing that the adopted 
law did indeed incorporate the central 
demands made by the EU, conditional-
ity was again unsuccessful. 
In the case of CSSA, trade unions, 
behaving as status quo seekers, repre-
sented a strong third-party negotiation 
partner for the government. Slowdown 
was the government’s main instru-
ment to manage external and domestic 
third parties’ demands for reform. The 
adoption of CSSA was postponed se-
veral times, as no agreement with trade 
unions could be reached. The EU, al-
though more moderate than the radi-
cals from the World Bank and the IMF, 
reacted with the use of conditionality to 
push for adoption. However, the Croa-
tian government resisted this demand, 
pointing to the need to continue nego-
tiations with the third-party actors; the 
government ultimately succeeded, as the 
EU dropped its conditions.
In both reform initiatives, external 
actors first used democracy assistance to 
guide democratic reforms and later re-
sorted to the use of (coercive) diploma-
cy and conditionality. Coercive means of 
diplomacy and conditionality were em-
ployed when the success of the reform 
attempts seemed to be in danger – for 
example, when domestic actors revert-
ed to slowdown, modification, or resist-
ance in response to demands for reform. 
However, the use of diplomacy and 
conditionality had only a limited effect 
on the course of reform. In the case of 
CSSA, where third parties were involved 
in negotiations at the domestic level, the 
EU had to accept resistance and slow-
down because of the government’s obli-
gation to reach a compromise with the 
trade unions before adoption. In the 
























party actor was part of the policy-mak-
ing procedure, the EU was forced to ac-
cept resistance and modification when 
the Croatian government made it clear 
that it would not agree to more radical 
changes and was able to convince the 
Commission that the adopted law would 
follow EU principles.
5. Conclusions
This contribution shows that de-
mocracy promotion involves constant 
interactions between international de-
mocracy promoters and domestic actors 
in negotiating the content of democra-
tic reforms, and that third parties mat-
ter as well in this process. To trace this 
process, a new typology was employed 
describing the instruments and means 
used by external and domestic actors in 
their interplay during democracy pro-
motion. A case study of the Public Ad-
ministration Reform (PAR) in Croatia 
served as the empirical basis for our in-
vestigation. Two concrete reform initia-
tives, the General Administrative Proce-
dures Act (GAPA) and the Civil Service 
Salary Act (CSSA) were analysed. 
The analysis of the two reform pro-
jects validates our first argument, name-
ly, that the interplay of external and do-
mestic actors influences the results of 
reform. Our investigation shows that 
demands for democratic reform and 
the initiative to place these issues on the 
agenda come mostly from the external 
side. Within PAR in Croatia, we found 
no incidents in which domestic actors 
took the lead in proposing a reform is-
sue to external actors. Domestic actors 
in Croatia had to adapt to external re-
form demands, learn how external ac-
tors organize policy-making, projects, 
and programmes, and then take over the 
implementation of basic liberal demo-
cratic principles in their political system. 
Although the EU was formally exclud-
ed from policy adoption in the Croatian 
parliament, it sought to speed up the 
process by the use of (soft) conditional-
ity and diplomatic pressure. 
However, the Croatian case also 
shows us that the external-domestic 
relationship is not completely a one-
way street. Domestic actors employ a 
wide range of instruments with which 
they can alter external preferences and 
through which they can succeed in con-
vincing external actors to accept modi-
fications of drafted laws and to change 
reform objectives. In both investigat-
ed reform endeavours, the EU was ul-
timately obliged to drop certain aspects 
of its desired reforms, despite using all 
available instruments to avoid this out-
come.
Considering our second argument, 
especially the analysis of CSSA strik-
ingly demonstrates the influence of do-
mestic third parties, in this case trade 
unions, on reform results. The Croatian 
government had to use slowdown and 
modification to react both to external 
and domestic third parties’ reform de-
mands. External actors employed more 
coercive forms of diplomacy and condi-
tionality in turn. If an agreement about 
CSSA is reached at some point in the fu-
ture, it will differ significantly from the 
original demands made by the EU, due 
to domestic third party involvement 
and their wish for modifying the re-
form draft proposal. In contrast to oth-
er scholars, however, we do not perceive 
this as wilful interference of third party 
actors, but instead as a sign of a great-
er capability of domestic actors to or-
ganize their interests and to use demo-
cratic means of negotiating and lobbying 












their preferences heard. This kind of 
interest-formation and -articulation is 
a common feature in consolidated de-
mocracies. Thereby, Croatia might be 
more progressed on its way towards de-
mocracy than the EU, which expects its 
demands to be smoothly complied with, 
can handle.
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Stvaranje države članice EU-a promicanjem demokracije:
slučaj reforme javne uprave u Hrvatskoj
SAŽETAK  Studija govori o procesu stvaranja članice EU-a promicanjem demokracije u slu-
čaju Hrvatske, s posebnim naglaskom na dvjema reformskim inicijativama iz područja re-
forme javne uprave (PAR). Iskustvo Hrvatske reprezentativno je za napore međunarodne 
zajednice da prevlada posljedice nasilnog raspada države i građanskog rata. EU je po-
sebno potpomogao postkonfliktnu demokratizaciju diplomatskim inicijativama, osigura-
njem pomoći i političkim uvjetovanjem. Hrvatska politička elita pokazala je veliku sprem-
nost da primijeni demokratske reforme, ali je istovremeno bila kritična prema onome što 
je smatrano “prevelikim” miješanjem u unutarnja pitanja države. Na temelju 30 intervjua 
s hrvatskim dužnosnicima, akterima civilnoga društva, članovima EU-delegacije i drugim 
predstavnicima međunarodne zajednice empirijski se procjenjuju napredak i poteškoće u 
reformi javne uprave u Hrvatskoj te se objašnjava zašto su neke reforme uspješno imple-
mentirane, a druge nisu.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  Hrvatska, demokratizacija, promicanje demokracije, Europska Unija, me-
đuigra vanjske i unutarnje politike, izgradnja država članica
